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EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF DE-
CEPTION ("LIE-DETEcToR") TEsTs--
[New York] On trial for robbery
in the first degree, as a second of-
fender, the defendant offered the
expert testimony of Rev. W. G.
Summers as to the results of a
"lie-detector" test which had been
performed on him. Overruling the
objection of the district attorney
the court received the evidence
and permitted the jury to evaluate
it: People v. Kenny, 3 N. Y. S.
(2d) 348 (1938).
The principal case is the first re-
ported decision, and at that only a
trial court decision, allowing the
admissibility of the results of ma-
chines or instx uxents popularly
described as "lie-detectors." The
only two former cases both reached
the opposite result: Frye v.
United States, 293 Fed. 1013 (D.
C. 1923); State v. Bohner, 210 Wis.
651, 246 N. W. 314 (1933).
The Frye case decided in 1923
involved the use of the systolic
blood pressure test of W. M. Mars-
ton and the court after an intelli-
gent consideration of the problem
said:
" We think that the systolic
blood pressure deception test has
not yet gained such standing and
scientific recognition among phy-
siological and psychological au-
thorities as would justify the
courts in admitting evidence de-
duced from the discovery, de-
velopment, and experiments thus
far made.'
Being the first case on the point it
received many able and favorable
criticisms in legal publications:
(1924) 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1138;
(Y924) 33 Yale L. J. 771; (1924)
24 Col. L. Rev. 429.
Ten years later the Wisconsin
court passing on the admissibility
of a proffered test on the Keeler
Polygraph still felt that deception
tests had not yet passed beyond
the experimental stage; see notes
in (1933) 24 J. Crim. L. 440; (1933)
13 B. U. L. Rev. 321; (1933) 8 Wis.
L. Rev. 283.
But by March, 1938, the Queens
County Court of New York decides
that the Rev. Summers' develop-
ment of the pathometer is safely
beyond the experimental stage.
For the court, as in the two previ-
ous cases, adopts as a basis the
legal principle set out in 2 Wig-
more, Evidende (2d ed. 1923) §875:
"if ever there is devised a psycho-
logical test of the evaluation of
witnesses the law will run to meet
it." And this court is confident the
time has come.
[ 287]
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A brief review of Father Sum-
mers' accomplishments and claims
for his instrument as given in the
preliminary examination readily
reveals the basis for this view of
the court. As head of the Depart-
ment of Psychology at the Gradu-
ate School of Fordham University,
Summers holds two Ph.D.'s: one
in physics from Georgetown Uni-
versity, and one in psychology
from Gregorian University at
Rome. Besides this he has done
research at Prague University in
Czechoslovakia and at the Uni-
versity of Vienna. And he mod-
estly claims practical infallibility
for his deception tests in 6,000
laboratory tests and 49 tests of ac-
tual criminal suspects. Such a
record is not to be taken lightly
and to- better evaluate the worth
of it requires a brief summary of
the work and achievements of
other experimenters in the field.
Physical appearance, motions,
and mannerisms of a witness are
well recognized tests of his credi-
bility both in the lay and in the
judicial mind: Howard v. Louis-
ville Ry., 32 Ky. L. 309, 105 S. W.
932 (1907); Boykin v. People, 22
Colo. 496, 45 Pac. 419 (1896); but
see Purdy v. People, 140 Ill. 46, 29
N. E. 700 (1892). But in recent years
there has been a steady effort to
develop more scientific tests. Some
thirty years ago Professor Miin-
sterberg advocated an "association
word and reaction test" for use by
the courts (Miinsterberg, On the
Witness Stand, 73). But the prac-
ticality of such a test was blasted
by Professor Wigmore, (1909) 3
Ill. L. Rev. 399, and the develop-
ment swung off to physical phe-
nomenon.
In 1914 Benussi developed the
respiratory test based on the rela-
tion between false answers and the
inspiration-expiration ratio. This
method was later refined and used
by Burtt of Ohio State University;
cf. (1923) 4 J. of Experimental
Psych. 1. Meanwhile W. M. Mars-
ton working under Miinsterberg at
Harvard developed a test based on
the changes of the blood pressure;
(f917) 2 J. of Experimental Psych.
117; (1921') 11 J. Crim. L. 551.
Later Dr. J. A. Larson conceived
the idea of combining the respira-
tory and blood pressure tests to
form the so-called Berkeley Lie-
Detector Test and for the first time
actual work was done in connec-
tion with the police. His results
were most encouraging but he ad-
mitted at that time there was no
test which was suitable for "the
positive identification of decep-
tion"; (1922) 47 A. B. A. Rep. 619;
(1921) f2 J. Crim. L. 390. For the
best discussion of the theory and
development of these various tech-
niques see McCormick, Deception
Tests and the Law of Evidence,
(1927) 15 Cal. L. Rev. 484.
Since that time the main work
has been done during the past eight
years by Leonarde Keeler and his
associates at the Scientific Crime
Detection Laboratory of North-
western University School of Law.
Fourteen years ago Keeler de-
veloped his "Polygraph" which
combines instruments for testing
the respiratory changes, the
changes in the blood pressure, and
the rate of heart beat. Later he
supplemented his technique and
instrument with a psychogalvano-
graph similar to that used by Sum-
mers; Keeler, A Method for De-
tecting Deception, (1930) 1 Am. J.
Pol. Sci. 38; Inbau, The "Lie-De-
tector," (1935) 40 Sci. Mon. 81.
Well over 14,000 tests have been
made including criminal suspects,
bank employees, and laboratory
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material. The results have been
remarkable but no claim of in-
fallibility is made. These experi-
menters estimate an accuracy of
85% in laboratory cases, and con-
fessions have been obtained in ap-
proximately 75% of actual cases
where deception was shown; cf.
Inbau, supra at 83.
During all this period psychol-
ogy departments in many colleges
and universities have been experi-
menting with the changes in
electrical resistance of the skin
as a test of deception. Re-
quiring only a galvanometer and a
Wheatstone bridge, it provides a
simple yet extremely sensitive in-
strument for laboratory work. Yet
most workers have not found it too
reliable when used alone. When
used in connection with the pneu-
mograph and the sphygmomano-
meter, as with the Keeler Poly-
graph, it has proven to be of some
assistance; but not of any consider-
able practical value in actual cases.
Now Father Summers in his self-
styled psychograph or pathometer
employs only an instrument for
recording the psycho-galvanic re-
action of the skin. From his testi-
mony in the Kenny case we learn
that he began his work in 1931.
While working on human emo-
tional reactions he was led off into
the field of detection of deception,
and he has occupied himself with
that since 1932. After testing 6,000
"guinea pigs" in his laboratory he
was convinced that his apparatus
and technique were "effectively
100% efficient." And in a critical
test of 271 persons divided into
three groups he claims to have
been able to detect 98% of the
guilty, better than 98% of the ac-
complices, and 100% of the inno-
cent. As he states it, such results
are due to the refinement of his
instrument and the peculiar
rhythm and repetition used in the
asking of significant questions.
Thoroughly convinced of the effec-
tiveness of his test Summers was
ready for the outside world. So
he performed tests of 49 actual
suspects; offered his testimony in
at least two trials; and aided the
sale of Conoco Oil in a full page
advertisement giving a picture and
chart of the "Lie-Detector" (May
21, 1938), Saturday Evening Post.
Yet when asked by the defense
counsel in the Kenny case as to
the results of the 49 actual cases
the following delightfully vague
dialogue occurred:
Q. Now Father, in connection
with those 49 cases with re-
spect to which you were
asked to apply this machine
or apparatus on, would you
tell us what the result of that
was?
A. The results have been, in all
the cases which are closed
to date, uniformly confirma-
tory of our results.
Q. In other words the courts
subsequently affirmed or the
public officials subsequently
confirmed the results that
you received from your use
of this apparatus?
A. Or-yes, that is substantially
correct.
In view of the general develop-
ment of lie detection and of the
specific work of Summers, was the
court justified in deciding that the
pathometer had gone beyond the
experimental stages into the realm
of general scientific acceptance?
We do not believe so for two rea-
sons.
First, no other experimenter in
the field has been able to claim
100% efficiency. The Staff of the
Scientific Crime Detection Labora-
tory using a psycho-galvanometric
test, in connection with two other
recognized tests, make no such
claim of infallibility. So, unless we
are to write Summer's claim off as
pure exaggeration, we must credit
his technique and interpretation of
results with almost unbelievable
efficacy. Secondly, it is apparent
that Summers has not yet con-
ducted enough tests under actual
conditions to justify his confidence
in the device. Other experimenters
have found the galvanometric test
more reliable in laboratory work
than in actual practice. Yet Sum-
mers assumes just the opposite, al-
though he has tried it on only 49
actual cases. Further, on these 49
cases it is not at all clear from the
testimony how the results were
checked or what was the mathe-
matical percentage of accuracy.
But the court, anxious to lead
the way and desirous of showing
its breadth of vision and liberality,
accepts Summers findings as un-
debatable. They point out that ob-
jections to scientific evidence are
not novel; that the admissibility of
fingerprints, handwriting analysis,
rifle markings, and psychiatric evi-
dence came only after constant re-
buffs. This is all very true but it
is no reason for a too hasty ac-
ceptance of the "lie-detector"; cf.
Inbau, Scientific Evidence in Crim-
inal Cases, (1934) 24 J. Crim. L.
825, 1140. The arguments of the
Frye case and the Bohner case
still seem peculiarly applicable to
the pathometer.
Even today, fifteen years after
the first case, there is no substan-
tial agreement either as to instru-
ment or as to technique. Summers
claims his is the reliable one.
Marston in his recent book, "The
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Lie-Detector Test" (1938), scoffs at
Summers and claims his invention
of the systolic blood pressure test
is the reliable test; see Inbau, Book
Review (pp. 305-308, this Journal),
and (June, 1938) 33 Ill. L. Rev.,
which characterizes this book as
very unscientific. And the Scien-
tific Crime Detection Laboratory
Staff believe their work has been
the most trustworthy, while at the
same time acknowledging severe
limitations upon the accuracy of
the technique. In such a state of
scientific disagreement the objec-
tion of the Wisconsin court in the
Bohner case is cogent: "the admis-
sion of the lie-detector may easily
result in the trial of the lie-detec-
tor rather than the issues of the
case."
But even more compelling is the
possibility of "complications and
abuses" foreseen by the court in
the Bohner case and argued to the
court in the Kenny case. At the
present time there are a host of
incompetent and unscrupulous
persons awaiting the admission of
the lie detection test to offer their
own "lie-detectors" tests to the
highest bidder; cf. Keeler, De-
bunking the Lie-Detector, (1934)
25 J. Crim. L. 153, 159; Inbau, De-
tection of Deception Technique
Admitted as Evidence, (1935) 26 J.
Crim. L. 262, 270; Inbau, The Ad-
missibility of Scientific Evidence,
(October, 1935) Law and Con-
temporary Problems (Duke Uni-
versity). Inasmuch as the tests de-
pend largely on a diagnosis of the
results registered by the instru-
ments the matter can at best be
largely one of opinion. Conse-
quently there is no tangible cri-
teria by which judge or jury may
adequately evaluate the testimony.
So this field, far more than finger-
prints, or ballistics, is prone to the
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quackery of self-seeking indi-
viduals.
The decision in the Kenny case
having been for the defendant, it
is very doubtful if there will be an
appeal to the higher court. But
shortly after it was decided a de-
fendant in a murder trial in the
Ndw York City Court in Kings
County offered the testimony of
Summers once again. This court
refused to follow the Kenny case
and rejected the evidence: Peo-
ple v. Forte, U. S. L. Wk., July 5,
1938, p. 12. In line with what we
have said that seems to be the
sounder view.
Perhaps the best solution is a
compromise position: allow the
evidence to be admitted only if the
prosecuting attorney and the de-
fense counsel mutually agree on a
particular test and also agree to
accept the results as evidence.
This procedure was followed in a
Wisconsin case, State v. Loniello
and Grignano, in the Circuit Court
of Columbia County; see for a dis-
cussion of this case Inbau, Detec-
tion of Deception Technique Ad-
mitted as Evidence, (1935) 26 J.
Crim. L. 262. Such a procedure
avoids the two main objections to
the wholesale admission of such
evidence at the present time. First,
there will be no necessity for long
examinations of the expert wit-
nesses and their techniques. Sec-
ondly, we can be assured that both
sides will make an honest effort to
engage a competent and reliable
operator for the test. And thus
may we simply and effectively
keep the quacks and their "lie-
detectors" from the courtrooms.
HoRACE W. JoiA_.
FomEr JEOPARDY-DIERSE OF-
EMNSES SUBSISTING IN ONE ACT.-
[Illinois] While accused was driv-
ing his automobile down the wrong
side of the street at a high rate of
speed, he simultaneously struck
and killed two pedestrians (A & B).
Upon being indicted for the man-
slaughter of A, the accused was set
at liberty under the Illinois statute
providing for discharge for want of
prosecution within four months of
commitment. Smith-Hurd Ill.
Crim. Code ch. 38 §748. Subse-
quently the accused was indicted
and convicted of the manslaughter
of B. This conviction was affirmed
over defendant's plea on appeal of
double jeopardy. People v. Allen,
14 N. E. (2d) 397 (1938) (two jus-
tices dissenting). The court stated
that there was no constitutional
bar to conviction here as the con-
stitutional provision against double
jeopardy looks to the identity of
the offense and not to the act, cit-
ing State v. Billotto, 104 Oh. St. 13,
35 N. E. 285 (1922). Looking,
then, to the identity of the offense,
the court determines that two of-
fenses may spring from a single act
and both may be prosecuted sep-
arately without placing the of-
fender in double jeopardy.
On this point the courts are in
hopeless conflict. One line of cases
holds the act to be one offense re-
gardless of the number or degree
of the consequences of that act.
State v. Wheelock, 216 Iowa 1428,
250 N. W. 617 (1933) (three per-
sons killed in auto accident through
negligence of accused; acquittal of
defendant on charge of manslaugh-
ter of one victim a bar to further
prosecution for manslaughter of
others); Smith v. State, 159 Tenn.
674, 21 S. W. (2d) 400 (1929)
(where a previous conviction for
manslaughter bars conviction for
assault); People v. Barr, 259 N. Y.
104, 1"81 N. E. 64 (1932) (Court
held death of ten people in one fire
constituted but one offense). Also
State v. Damon, 2 Tyler 387 (Vt.,
1803); Sadberry v. State, 39 Tex.
Cr. Rep. 466, 46 S. W. 639 (1898);
16 C. J. 283. The opposite line of
authority says the act may result
in more than one offense, as in the
principal case. State v. Fredlund,
200 Minn. 44, 273 N. W. 353 (1937)
(auto collision resulted in death of
two people; acquittal on trial for
death of one not a bar to further
prosecution for death of the other);
Fay v. State, 71 P. (2d) 768 (Okla.,
1937) (several children struck by
auto at the same time); State v.
Taylor, 1:85 Wash. 198, 52 P. (2d)
1252 (1936) (five persons killed in
auto collision, each killing a sep-
arate offense), also Vaughn v.
Commonwealth, 2 Va. Cas. 273
(1821); People v. Vaughn, 215 Ill.
App. 452 (1919).
The utter confusion existing in
this field is well illustrated by com-
paring those cases mentioned
above, when several deaths occur
from a single act and yet only one
offense can be charged, with the
cases where two degrees of a crime
are involved, as homicide and as-
sault. In the latter type of case
some jurisdictions will punish both
degrees of the crime. State v.
Standifer, 5 Porter 523 (Ala.,
1837); Winn v. State, 92 Wis. 571,
52 N. W. 775 (1892). This some-
times results in the anomaly of a
defendant who kills twice with the
same bullet being better protected
from punishment than another de-
fendant who kills one and wounds
the other of his victims.
Several tests have been advanced
by the various courts which are
supposed to aid in the determina-
tion of the question whether there
is one offense or more. Some
merely state that when there has
RECENT CRIMINAL CASES
been but a single act, there must
necessarily be but a single offense.
See Gunter v. State, 111 Ala. 23,
20 So. 632 (1895); Spannell v. State,
83 Tex. Cr. Rep. 118, 203 S. W. 357
(1918). This seems to be more a
flat declaration of policy than a
test. A related criterion has been
labelled the "same transaction"
test which holds that a series of
acts closely connected, as the repe-
titious shooting of a gun, may con-
stitute one act in law and thus one
offense. State v. Houchins, 102 W.
Va. 169, 134 S. E. 740 (1926). By
this test the perpetrators of the
St. Valentine's Day massacre
(where seven men were murdered
by a gangsters machine gun)
would have constituted but one of-
fense. A third standard is the sub-
jective one called the intent test.
Under this view the court looks
into the mind of the accused to de-
termine whether he has a single or
multiple intent. If only one intent
is found then there is a single of-
fense, regardless of the number or
severity of the results of the de-
fendant's act. Hurst v. State, 24
Ala. App. 47, 129 So. 714 (1930);
Burnam v. State, 58 S. E. 683 (Ga.,
1907). To find a separate intent
for every offense is pure conjec-
ture at best. Who can accurately
read the inner thoughts and feel-
ings of another's mind? In cases
of criminal negligence, as the in-
stant case, the intent test obviously
fails, for intent is not involved.
However, some jurisdictions which
sponsor this standard say that the
negligent killing of two or more by
the same act could not be more
than one offense, because there
was no intent. See State v. Whee-
lock, supra, and cases there cited.
Another and perhaps the most
logical test used by the courts is
called the "same evidence" test,
RECENT CRIMINAL CASES 293
an objective test which looks to the
identity of the offense rather than
that of the act or the intent. Whar-
ton on Criminal Law (12th ed.
1932) §396; Vaughn v. Common-
wealth, supra; State v. Billotto,
supra; State v. Fredlund, supra;
People v. Majors, 65 Cal. 138 3 Pac.
597 (1'884); State v: Corbett, 117
S. C. 356, 109 S. E. 133 (1921).
Thus, where there has been two
or more killings, there are as many
offenses as there are deaths, no
matter if there is only one intent
or but a single act. The courts
have circumvented the procedural
double jeopardy difficulty by plac-
ing emphasis upon the name of the
person injured. State v. Clavey,
355 Ill. 358, 189 N. E. 364 (1934)
(where the name" of deceased was
held to be an essential fact in the
indictment); Wharton, op. cit. §646.
But see State v. Wheelock, supra.
Thus where the facts are the same
under two indictments, the court
will allow conviction under both
indictments if the second indict-
ment differs from the first only as
to the name of the injured person.
The basic reason for all these
rules penetrates to a question of
policy that can be decided only
after one determines whether the
killing of one individual as such is
an offense against the state. If one
is to be responsible for the conse-
quences of his reckless acts, as in
manslaughter, then that one should
be responsible for as many killings
as spring from his criminally negli-
gent act. It is difficult to under-
stand why two killings should be
punishable as one if they happened
to have come about through a
single act. In tort law a tort fea-
sor is liable for all consequences
of negligence which he could rea-
sonably foresee. Why not apply
this doctrine to the criminally
negligent also? Then a reckless
driver, as in the instant case,
should foresee, that his recklessness
might result in the death of one,
two, or more people. He has a
separate foreseeability for each
person, so that each injury consti-
tutes a separate offense and is pun-
isbable as such. The criticism of
this argument, that repetition of
trial will hinder court efficiency
and subject accused to consecutive
trials, is answered by a possibility
of joinder of similar offenses in one
indictment. The principal case in
effect recognizes the analogy to
tort principles and lays stress on
the consequences rather than the
act or intent. This rationale of the
problem seems the most sensible
as it exacts a just penalty from
the criminal for his crimes against
society.
0. WENDELj LAwNi G.
EvKNCE-AD nsssiBIrvY OF Evi-
DENCE OF A CoxsPIRAcY NOT
CHARGED IN THE IbicTi mr.-[New
York] Can an accused be con-
victed under an indictment charg-
ing him with having done certain
specific acts, when the proof ad-
duced at the trial shows merely
that he conspired with others to
do these acts, and that his co-con-
spirators actually did them? This
was the question before the Court
of Appeals of New York in the re-
cent case of People v. Luciano, 14
N. E. 2d, 433. The court answered
the question affirmatively.
Luciano and others were mem-
bers of a gang of criminals which
sought to gain control of prostitu-
tion and other commercialized vice
in New York City. The prostitutes
were induced to work through the
combination by force and violence.
In return for various sums paid by
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them, the women received room
and board and "protection," con-
sisting of bail and legal defense if
they were arrested. Luciano and
his confederates were indicted for
three types of crime: placing a fe-
male in a house of prostitution, re-
ceiving money for having so placed
her, and receiving money from the
earnings of the woman so placed,
without giving consideration there-
for. There was no evidence sub-
mitted to prove that Luciano him-
self did any of these acts. How-
ever, the jury found that he had
conspired with others to do them,
and that these others had per-
formed them. On the basis of the
conspiracy he was convicted. This
is entirely in accord with New
York authority. Penal Law of
New York §2; People v. McKane,
143 N. Y. 455, 8 N. E. 950 (1894);
People v. Bliven, 112 N. Y. 79, 19
N. E. 638 (1889); People v. Cassidy,
213 N. Y. 388, 107 N. E. 713 (1915);
People v. Wicks, 42 N. Y. S. 630,
affirmed without opinion, 154 N. Y.
766; 49 N. E. 1102 (1896); People
v. Micelli, 142 N. Y. S. 102, affirmed
without opinion, 216 N. Y. 727, 111
N. E. 1094 (1:913), and cases there
cited. In view of these precedents,
the dissent of Judge Rippey, based
in part on the ground that the de-
fendant was convicted of a crime
with which he was not charged, is
surprising.
People v. McKane, 143 N. Y. 455,
38 N. E. 950 (1894), is the leading
New York case on this point. The
defendant in that case induced
members of the board of registry
to violate the Election Law. He
was charged with violating that
law and was convicted, although
the statute was so worded that
only members of the board were
legally capable of violating it. He
had conspired to break it and that
was considered enough upon which
to convict him. In the earlier case
of People v. Bliven, 112 N. Y. 79,
19 N. E. 638 (1889), the defendant
was convicted of performing acts
which he himself could not actually
have performed at that time, as he
was absent when the crime was
committed. The court said: "It
[the crime] was proved by show-
ing that the act although committed
by a third person, and in the ab-
sence of defendant, was so com-
mitted by his aid and procure-
ment, and in that way in law and
in morals and in good sense he
committed the act himself." Judge
Chase summed up the New York
view in People v. Cassidy, 213 N.
Y. 388, 107 N. E. 713 (1915), when
he stated: "When sufficient evi-
dence of a common design and
purpose amounting to a conspiracy
has been given to make the ques-
tion one for the jury, any evidence
of the acts and declarations of the
conspirators in furtherance of the
common purpose is competent. In
a case like this it is not necessary
in order to make such proof com-
petent that the conspiracy should
be charged in the indictment:'
This seems to be the general rule
as well. Wharton's Criminal Evi-
dence (1l'th ed. 1935) §701. Ham-
mond v. State, 173 Ark. 674, 298 S.
W. 714 (1927); Cossack v. U. S.,
(C. C. A. 9th, 1936), 82 F. (2d)
214, cert. denied, 298 U. S. 654;
298 U. S. 678, rehearing denied,
298 U. S. 691 (1936); Coplin
v. U. S., (C. C. A. 9th, 1937), 88 F.
(2d) 652, 660; Belden et al. v. U. S.,
(C. C. A. 9th, 191:5), 223 Fed. 726;
Vilson v. U. S. (C. C. A. 9th, 1932),
61 F. (2d) 901; Kraus v. U. S.,
(C. C. A. 8th, 1937), 87 F. (2d) 656;
Lee Dip v. U. S., (C. C. A. 9th,
1937), 92 F. (2d) 802, cert. de-
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nied, 58 S. C. R. 526, 82 L. Ed. 510
(1938).
One New York case goes further.
It is People v. Putnam, 85 N. Y. S.
1056, affirmed without opinion, 179
N. Y. 518, 71 N. E. 1135 (1904).
The defendant in that case was in-
dicted for grand larceny. He was
found to be one of a group of con-
spirators prosecuting the felonious
enterprise. He was not only con-
victed on the basis of the con-
spiracy, but the court allowed evi-
dence to be introduced against him
of the acts of his co-conspirators
in a similar undertaking, but one
in which he was not concerned.
The case of Lee Dip v. U. S. (C. C.
A. 9th, 1937) 92 F. (2d) 802, cert.
denied, 58 S. C. R. 526, 82
L. Ed. 510 (1938), might be con-
sidered an even further extension
of the principle, although when the
facts are considered there are
qualifying circumstances which
make the decision justifiable. The
defendant in that case was sus-
pected of concealing opium. While
the officers were searching his
premises, one Chin Fook came in
through the back door carrying
opium. The defendant was charged
with concealing grains of the nar-
cotic found on the premises, but
the evidence concerning Chin Fook
was admitted and held to have
been properly admitted upon ap-
peal. It was not proven that Chin
Fook was concerned in the con-
cealing of the opium for which the
defendant was indicted, nor that
Lee Dip and Chin Fook were con-
spirators in the opium business.
However, it was brought out at the
trial that they were partners in the
maintenance of a nearby gambling
house. Chin Fook had a key to
the defendant's premises, and there
were other circumstances tending
to show a close relationship be-
tween the two. In the principal
case, the evidence of the conspiracy
admitted was of the one in which
the defendant was a conspirator.
In the Putnam case, supra, the evi-
dence admitted concerned the acts
of the defendant's co-conspirators
in a similar undertaking, but one
in which the defendant was not
concerned. In the Lee Dip case
the court allowed evidence con-
cerning a possible conspirator to be
introduced who was not involved
in the transaction for which the de-
fendant was on trial. This is an
extension of the general view, and
it is doubtful if it is a wise one.
The evidence does not really con-
cern the charge for which the de-
fendant is on trial, and might con-
ceivably prejudice his interests.
The jury should not be influenced
by the crimes of his associates in
weighing his guilt or innocence.
On the whole, the doctrine as
expressed by the principal case
seems to be a sound one. It is cer-
tainly valuable, for if we did not
have it, criminals like Luciano
would be free today. There is no
reason to believe that it would be
unfair to the accused. If a person
has procured the commission of a
criminal act, or induced another to
commit it, he should be punished
as severely as the one actually per-
forming it. The mere fact that
conspiracy is indictable as a sep-
arate offense should not operate
to preclude its admissibility as evi-
dence in other criminal prosecu-
tions.
JAMS KAY.
